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Beyond Reason: The Legal Importance of Emotions 
 
Thom Brooks
*
 & Diana Sankey
**
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Deryck Beyleveld has forged a theory of ethical rationalism that has made an important 
impact on legal and moral philosophy—that this collection of essays makes clear. He has not 
only refined and improved the original account developed by Alan Gewirth, but provides us 
with ethical rationalism’s most prolific defender today. One area of particular insight is 
Beyleveld’s many applications of ethical rationalism to practice and, most especially, to 
medical law and ethics which has been especially influential.
1
 This work has set the bar for 
all proponents and critics alike. 
 
We focus narrowly on a specific concern that we have with ethical rationalism: its primacy of 
rationality over other characteristics, such as our emotions. This is not to deny the importance 
of reason in our thinking about law and ethical concerns. But we have concerns with any 
view that holds that reason is the only key to how any tensions should be resolved. Such a 
position claims for reason a privileged status it does not have or merit. One problem for us is 
that, in our view, ethical rationalism does not appear to adequately consider the importance of 
emotions and so it does not provide a satisfactory account of law and morality as a result. We 
examine this concern in the first part of our chapter. 
 
This chapter’s second part raises concerns with the application of ethical rationalism as a 
model for understanding sexual offences. We highlight both the need to foreground emotion 
in order to understand the current law, as well as the dangers from a normative perspective of 
appearing to marginalise the role of emotion in sexual offences. Not only would a 
prioritisation of rationality fail to reflect the role emotion can play in current rape law, but we 
would argue, is particularly problematic in this area of law in terms of promoting justice. In 
summary, Beyleveld’s ethical rationalism exercises an important impact on legal theory and 
legal practices. Nonetheless, we raise some reservations about its connection to these impacts 
that lead us to support revisions to this approach. 
 
2. Law and Ethical Rationalism 
 
This section spells out a key concern we have about ethical rationalism. This is as a kind of 
rationalism that prioritises rationality over sensibility and the emotions. We outline how 
ethical rationalism is committed to this view in its defence of the Principle of Generic 
Consistency (PGC). We argue that this position should be revised so that it more clearly 
accounts for human beings as having both reason and emotions—and build on the importance 
of emotions for the law in section 3.  
 
A. Rationalism or reasonableness? 
                                                 
*
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1
  For example, see D Beyleveld, The Dialectical Necessity of Morality: An Analysis and Defence of Alan 
Gewirth’s Argument to the Principle of Generic Consistency (University of Chicago Press 1991); D 
Beyleveld, ‘A Reply to Marcus G. Singer on “Gewirth, Beyleveld and Dialectical Necessity’ (2002) 15 
Ratio Juris 458 and D Beyleveld and R Brownsword, Consent in the Law (Hart 2007). 
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Our first concern is that ethical rationalism prioritises one feature—rationalism—above 
others, including sensibility. To this end, our emotions do not appear to play any important 
role on a par with rationality with little, if any, substantive effect on ethical rationalism. This 
is a concern because it is unclear that rationalism can provide the solid foundation its 
proponents claim with consequences for the suitability of such an approach for thinking about 
the law.  
 
Developed from original work by Alan Gewirth, Deryck Beyleveld’s ethical rationalism 
develops Gewirth’s conception of the PGC. Beyleveld’s argument is dialectical and it has 
three stages.
2
 The first stage begins with the position that agents claim—as agents—that they 
do (or intend to do) some act voluntarily for some purpose. This claim necessarily accepts 
that my purpose for acting is good, that my ‘freedom and well-being are generically 
necessary conditions’ of my having agency and that my freedom and well-being are 
‘necessary goods’.  
 
At this stage of the argument, it does not matter what the purposes for acting might be.
3
 We 
consider agency only from ‘the internal viewpoint’ of an agent.4 Beyleveld claims the ‘key 
question’ here is to ask what an agent may do.5 But this question is to be answered only from 
a specific perspective: agents ‘must be able to ask the question, “What is it rational or 
permissible for me to do?”’.6 Some purposes—namely, ‘rational’ purposes—count to the 
exclusion of others. 
 
Stage two of the argument states that it is ‘dialectically necessary’ for an agent to consider 
‘that he has rights to the generic conditions of agency’.7 It is not enough that an agent can do 
some action for a chosen purpose. These generic conditions of voluntarily choosing an 
agent’s actions are rights held by this agent. This appears to be explained by the fact that if an 
agent did not have rights to the generic conditions for her agency then her ability to exist as 
an agent might become compromised.
8
 
 
Stage three of the argument for the PGC holds that it follows ‘purely logically’ that any agent 
must consider that all other agents have the same ‘generic rights’ in equal measure.9 
Beyleveld states this view as ‘It is merely because I am an agent that I have the generic 
rights’.10 Agents must necessarily possess generic conditions of their agency as rights—that 
are recognised by any other agent. But these logical manoeuvres consider agents in general, 
in terms of what is rational for any agent in general to do. 
 
It is then unsurprising to find that Beyleveld defends the PGC it as a principle that ‘is the 
supreme rational reference point for judging the permissibility of all actions’.11 The PGC is 
‘[l]ike Kant’s argument for “the moral law”’ and attempts to establish the PGC in a 
                                                 
2
  Beyleveld n1, at 13-46. 
3
  See D Beyleveld, ‘The Principle of Generic Consistency as the Supreme Principle of Human Rights’ 
(2012) 13 Human Rights Review 1, at 2 (‘i.e., in order to pursue or achieve his own purposes, 
regardless of what these might be’) (italics given). 
4
  Beyleveld n3, at 3. 
5
  Beyleveld n3, at 4. 
6
  Beyleveld n3, at 4. 
7
  Beyleveld n3, at 3. 
8
  See Beyleveld n3, at 5 (‘generic damage to my capacity to act’). 
9
  Beyleveld n3, at 3. 
10
  Beyleveld n3, at 5. 
11
  See Beyleveld n3, at 2. 
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‘completely a priori’ way.12 This is ‘not empirical’ as an exercise—it is explicitly rationalist. 
Beyleveld claims that we are to ask ‘What is it rational or permissible for me to do?’13 Only 
‘reason’ is identified as being what ‘may require’ an agent ‘to do something only to the extent 
that he can do it’—not our emotional or other responses to circumstances.14 Not unlike the 
universalism of Kant’s moral law, Beyleveld argues ‘since all agents must accept parallel 
reasoning, it follows that the PGC is dialectically necessary for all agents’.15 A particular 
view of rationality rules to the exclusion of rival possibilities. 
 
This brief sketch of the argument for the PGC usefully highlights the clear rationalist nature 
of this project—and the relative absence of emotions. What counts for the argument is that it 
should ‘follow purely logically’ from one stage to the next in a manner that relates to every 
individual the same.
16
 This logical path is the freeway of reason absent any clear influence of 
more twisting trails of emotions, sentimentality or inclination.  
 
In The Dialectical Necessity of Morality, little mention is made of emotions beyond two short 
passages: 
 
Gewirth does not deny feelings or emotions legitimacy. On the contrary, it could be 
said that the theory provides a specification of what constitutes rational emotions and 
feelings...Gewirth does deny the irrational…has legitimacy.17 
 
It is true that particular occurrent emotions (or attitudes) are not employed as criteria 
for what is permissible. To do so would, however, beg the question against those with 
different attitudes.
18
 
  
These brief passages express a clear view that feelings or emotions are not entirely irrelevant. 
It depends on whether they are ‘rational’ or not. So it is unimportant if an agent is motivated 
by any occurring emotional response because others might respond differently and, more 
specifically, in a non-rational way. It is our being ‘rational’ and thinking ‘logically’ that sets 
the terms for what is permissible under the PGC.   
 
Emotions can factor into the argument only if they are consistent with rationality. Their 
relationship appears analogous to the relation between the rational and the reasonable in John 
Rawls’s political liberalism.19 For Rawls, the rational is defined by two principles of justice 
that any individual might accept under the specified conditions of a hypothetical original 
position. He recognises that the rational can set the boundaries for political decision-making, 
but not help us specify its content beyond constitutional essentials. This middle ground is the 
reasonable that exists within the bounds of rationality and cast as the use of public reasons 
that can connect more directly with the fact of reasonable pluralism—that any community 
will be composed of individuals with different conceptions of the good. So long as all are 
                                                 
12
  Beyleveld n3, at 3. 
13
  Beyleveld n3, at 3 (emphasis added). 
14
  Beyleveld n3, at 5. 
15
  Beyleveld n3, at 6. 
16
  See Beyleveld n3, at 6. 
17
  Beyleveld n1, at 159. 
18
  Beyleveld n1, at 444. 
19
  See J Rawls, Political Liberalism, paper edn, 48-53 (Columbia University Press 1996); and T Brooks, 
‘The Capabilities Approach and Political Liberalism’ in T Brooks and MC Nussbaum (eds) Rawls’s 
Political Liberalism, 138–79 (Columbia University Press 2015) and S Freman, Rawls (Routledge 2007) 
324-64. 
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bound by the rational constraints discerned through the original position, free and equal 
citizens develop political liberalism through the use of public reason.  
 
Similarly, Beyleveld’s understanding of the PGC is that rationality sets the boundaries for 
what is permissible. Within these constraints, our emotions can have some role to play—
although how this might work is underdeveloped and not specified. But what is clear is that 
emotions do not play a leading role and not ‘employed as criteria for what is permissible’. 
This is left only to rationality—which appears to be understood as a commitment to the law 
of non-contradiction and general consistency across all agents although there are more than 
one understanding of what ‘rationality’ consists in as an essentially contested concept that is 
not neutral.
20
 
 
In sum, what counts for Beyleveld’s ethical rationalism is to a large degree free from 
empirical attitudinal relations that people possess. Beyleveld’s aim is to offer an account that 
is suitably universalistic to encompass any agent in principle, but we are unclear how well it 
accounts for agents in their concrete, everyday lives. 
 
We believe Beyleveld’s ethical rationalism can and should take greater account of our 
emotions. In the Phaedrus, Plato’s allegory of the charioteer is used to help us imagine a 
charioteer steering two horses as they fly across the Earth.
21
 One horse is white and pulls the 
chariot towards the sky; the other is black and pulls the chariot down towards the ground. 
Plato argues that we each face these tensions between our ethereal rationality and grounded 
sentiment. We should not choose one or the other because we’ll either rise so high we will 
burn in the sun like Icarus or come crashing back to Earth like a lead zeppelin. Instead, we 
should forge a middle path between them both through moderation. Humans are rational 
agents, but they are also emotional beings—and both of these aspects must be considered to 
grasp the human condition. To accept one and deny the other is to reject or ignore an 
important feature of who we are and so is incomplete and unsatisfactory. Our concern with 
ethical rationalism is that it runs this risk in prioritising rationality over emotions. 
 
One model for this kind of moderation can be found in Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities 
approach.
22
 She defends capabilities as our essential freedoms to do or be. They cover a wide 
range of individual capabilities from practical reason to the uses of our imagination. 
Nussbaum’s argument is that any minimally decent human life must be guaranteed above 
some minimum threshold of capabilities across these different areas.
23
 Capabilities are non-
competitive: we cannot satisfy the threshold condition by having large capabilities in some 
areas but not others. Nussbaum rejects such trade-offs between capabilities on the grounds 
that each is a capability insofar as each is an essential freedom constitutive of a minimally 
decent life.
24
 The satisfaction of the capabilities threshold need not require state intervention, 
                                                 
20
  See DP Green and I Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in 
Political Science (Yale University Press 1994); D Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (Penguin 2011) 
and A Hindmoor, Rational Choice (Palgrave Macmillan 2006). 
21
  Plato, ‘The Phaedrus’ in Complete Works, JM Cooper, ed (Hackett 1991) at 246a-254e. 
22
  See M Nussbaum, Women and Human Development (Cambridge University Press 2000). 
23
  Nussbaum n22, at 6. 
24
  This raises questions about whether any individual should be free to reject enjoying several or all 
capabilities—as Nussbaum argues we can—where the securing a minimal threshold of capability 
enjoyment across all capabilities is also argued to secure a minimally decent life. See T Brooks, ‘A 
New Problem with the Capabilities Approach’ (2014) 20 Harvard Review of Philosophy 100. 
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but it does require that the state ensure individuals can pursue capabilities above a 
threshold—even if they can choose not to do so.25 
 
The essential point here is that capabilities like our reasoning and imagination overlap. These 
are not entirely separate dimensions of human lives, but an integrated part of it—we require 
both for even a minimally decent life. This spills over into our understanding of 
reasonableness in law. Nussbaum argues that the reasonable person is not a rational 
automaton, but a thinking and feeling individual.
26
 Take the case of a police officer who is 
called to a dark alley where gunshots have been heard. She sees a figure in the dark that looks 
like he might be holding a weapon and asks him to stop. He refuses so shoots him fatally only 
to discover he was unarmed.  Nussbaum argues that however tragic the police officer is 
innocent and this is because what he means to be a reasonable person is a person with 
anxieties, fears, aspirations and so on.
27
 Yes, reason is important, but we aim for not 
rationality but reasonableness—and our emotions are a crucial component of that 
fundamental aspect of the human condition.  
 
The upshot is that ethical rationalism denies an important part of who we are in conceiving 
human beings as essentially rationalist. This is because it downplays other important 
characteristics of human experience. As the neurologist Anthony Damasio argues, the human 
mind does not operate separately from a body.
28
 None of us are a brain in a vat. Our emotions 
and feelings are essential to our reasoning and decision-making—at least from a neurological 
perspective. To deny it is to reject a part of our physiology. In sum, human beings—and 
human thinking—is more than pure rationalism. Our emotions matter for our humanity and 
for how we understand the world. This is because they colour and inform our experiences. 
Any view about human agency must take into account more than our capacity for rational 
thinking alone if it is to capture how human beings are agents. 
 
In response, Beyleveld might reject this realist picture—he could deny the claim that our 
emotions matter in this way and that his account of ethical rationalism insufficiently accounts 
for them.
29
 He might claim that rational agents give importance to hope and fear—powerful 
emotions that are afforded a central place in his account. Their place is in providing 
motivation for agents to think and act. If not for our having hopes and fears—so Beyleveld’s 
argument goes—we might remain dormant and motionless. Human agents are rational, but it 
is our hope and fear that spurs agents to act. Agents act and their chosen purposes require 
motivation. Some rationally restricted view of emotions might play some part here. 
 
We believe this account of the emotions is too weak. Agents—even rational agents—are 
human beings with emotions and these will include far more sentiments than only our being 
hopeful or fearful. There is no clear rationale offered for why these two emotions alone 
should enjoy the special position they are given, or why other emotions could not be included 
on similar grounds. Individuals are inspired to think or act for more reasons than their having 
hope or fear. We might be moved by joy or melancholy, for example. But if only two should 
                                                 
25
  Nussbaum n22, at 51-53. 
26
  M Nussbaum, Hiding from Humanity: Shame, Disgust and the Law (Princeton University Press 2004), 
at 12. 
27
  Nussbaum n27, at 12-13. 
28
  See A Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain (Penguin 2005). 
29
  See D Beyleveld, ‘Williams’ False Dilemma: How to Give Categorically Binding Impartial Reasons to 
Real Agents’ (2013) 10 Journal of Moral Philosophy 204. 
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count, we need to know why these two instead of others. We believe there is no such 
convincing account offered to clarify this distinction. 
 
Nor is it clear that even the stated importance of our having hope and fear a sufficient warrant 
for concluding they have importance for Beyleveld’s account. This is because they count for 
little. Our having hope is largely an attitude about the future—that there will be a future. 
Acting like there will be a tomorrow is not clearly an emotional attitude, although it could be 
in cases of living like there is no tomorrow. It could be an assumption or postulate of moral 
reasoning.  Indeed, Beyleveld’s view of hope is described as ‘not cognitive’ and only 
‘conceptual’—a universal possibility for any agent. This understanding of emotions fails to 
acknowledge the cognitive states that emotions exist within and the ways in which they can 
affect our cognitive appreciation of ourselves in relation to others. Thus the ethical rationalist 
view of hope is it only gives us ‘reason to think’, but does not inform what or how we do or 
should think.
30
  
 
So emotions—like hope and fear—might be stipulated as important, however they do not 
play any important role for shaping the way we choose or think. They do not add to the 
content of what is thought. To say we might posit other agents as motivated by hope and fear 
is only to claim they are motivated to think and act like us. This says little about the emotions 
we have and our emotional relation to others—even through our individual hopes and fears. 
There is nothing about an agent’s motivation through hope and fear as such that influences 
the discussion—and it would make no substantive difference for Beyleveld’s account if we 
substituted other motivational emotions—given the limited, and perhaps trivial, role that 
emotions play. 
 
 
3. Ethical Rationalism and Sexual Offences 
 
We now show how these problems with the conception of the person and morality raise 
additional problems for applying ethical rationalism to criminal law relating to sexual 
offences. In prioritising rationality over emotionality, ethical rationalism may not fully reflect 
the realities and complexities of human behaviour in relation to sex and provide a 
comprehensive understanding of why the law regulates sexual behaviour in the way that it 
does.  Indeed, as Beyleveld emphasises, the PGC relates directly to agents and not to human 
beings, meaning that there is no requirement that agents are humans or gendered beings.
31
  
While the PGC is intended to be abstract, the application of it to sexual offences would 
require explicit recognition of the human context underlying sexual behaviour and the 
criminal law, which may be difficult given the conception of agency inherent within it, 
outlined above. Although Beyleveld’s (and Brownsword’s) more recent work on consent 
applies Gewirthian principles to the law of consent, this is still in many ways an abstract 
project that does not fully engage with the actual nature of the law or with the nature of 
human conduct in our view.
32
   
 
                                                 
30
  See the chapter in this book by Düring and Düwell. 
31
  D Beyleveld, ‘A Reply to Marcus G Singer on Gewirth, Beyleveld and Dialectical Necessity’ (2002) 
15(4) Ratio Juris 458,  
32
  Beyleveld and Brownsword, n 1.  Despite many examples, including of sexual situations, drawn on in 
the book, these are not fully fleshed out and the discussion of the application of the PGC to the law 
remains abstract.  
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We argue that the emotional complexity of human behaviour in relation to sexual offences 
means that application of the PGC to this area of law requires careful consideration. Firstly, 
sex is often intrinsically emotional and thus sexual offences law raises issues regarding how 
the law conceptualises the harm.  Secondly, sexual offences constitute an area of law where 
issues of gender are prominent and where emotional/rational, body/mind dualisms may play 
out, but equally where such dualisms have arguably been challenged in recent legal reforms, 
such that a focus on rationality fails to fully reflect the current legal framework.  Thirdly, 
sexual offences law highlights the problems of a focus on legal moralism in a morally 
pluralist society where the current legal framework represents a compromise between 
different moralistic and liberal concerns. We contend that understanding sexual offences 
requires recognition of the interrelationship between emotionality and rationality and the 
value of affect.  Emotion should play an important role in the law, but in a way that avoids 
the dangers of legal moralism.
33
  
A. Emotion and Criminal Law 
 
The role of emotion in the criminal law has been subject to increasing scholarly debate. In 
particular, there are emerging interdisciplinary literatures that have sought to explore the 
relationship between law and the emotions. Law and the emotions literatures provide insights 
into the ways in which criminal law is laden with emotion, thus challenging the traditional 
rational and objective representations of law.
34
 Such scholarship has highlighted the problems 
of describing and understanding the current legal framework if the role of emotions is 
excluded or marginalised, as well as the ways in which understanding emotion and affective 
responses can enrich the law.  
 
As Nussbaum and Dan Kahan have highlighted, understanding the role of emotion in 
criminal law depends on the way in which emotion is conceptualised.
35
 The history of 
criminal law reflects wider societal and philosophical debates between a mechanistic view of 
emotion, which emphasises the demarcation between emotion and cognition and prioritises 
rationality, and a more evaluative and cognitive approach that recognises that ‘emotion is 
integral to the process of reasoning’.36  Like other areas of law, criminal law has been 
influenced by a mechanistic demarcation between rationality and emotion.
37
 Indeed, 
individual criminal responsibility is to some extent founded on a model of a rational 
individual, who is generally in control of his or her emotions. Emotionality has sometimes 
been constituted in law as an exceptional state, rather than as an intrinsic feature of humanity.  
 
As feminist scholars have critiqued, the influence of the mechanistic demarcation between 
rationality and emotionality has served to marginalise women in law, as well as having 
significant racial and cultural overtones. Traditionally the masculine has been associated with 
rationality and objectivity, whilst the feminine has been associated with emotionality and 
subjectivity.
38
 Moreover, ‘the rationalist model of the person … has been, and really remains, 
a model of humanity in which a developed capacity for reason is thought to be the most 
                                                 
33
  M Nussbaum and DM Kahan, ‘Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law’ (1996) Columbia Law 
Review 269. 
34
  For discussion of the growth of literature in this area see K Abrams and H Keren, ‘Who's Afraid of 
Law and the Emotions?’ (2009) 94 Minnesota Law Review 1997. 
35
  Martha and Kahan, n 38. 
36
  Damasio, n 29 above, 144. 
37
  A Reilly, ‘The Heart of the Matter: Emotion in Criminal Defences’ (1997) Ottawa Law Review 117. 
38
  R Hunter, ‘Contesting the Dominant Paradigm: Feminist Critiques of Liberal Legalism’, in M Davies 
and V Munro, eds, The Ashgate Research Companion to Feminist Legal Theory (Ashgate, 2013), 13, 
14. 
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important thing about us (it is most humanising, most dignifying, most central to our persons) 
and therefore tends to be exclusive of many men’.39  Stemming most notably from Cartesian 
thought, the interrelationship between the emotional/rational and the body/mind dualisms 
also associates women with the body and embodiment, in opposition to rationality.
40
 ‘There 
is a fundamental sense in which women are constituted as “outsiders” to rationality precisely 
by being identified with embodiment (and its related emotionality)’.41  As the liberal legal 
person has traditionally been constructed in law as rational and autonomous, legal 
subjectivity has not always been attainable for women.
42
   
 
Nevertheless, a closer examination of the criminal law reveals the influence of a more 
evaluative conceptualisation of emotion and the pervasive presence of emotion, illustrating 
that law is capable of incorporating understandings of emotionality.
43
  While criminal law 
may appear to be based on mechanistic underpinnings, it has also been influenced by 
philosophical and scientific trends that have recognised the interrelationship between 
thought-processes and emotion. It is impossible to understand certain legal doctrines without 
incorporating a more evaluative approach to emotions.
44
  For example, the loss of control 
defence (previously provocation) is based both on the defendant’s experience of 
overwhelming emotion and on an appraisal of the reasonable nature of the emotion.
45
  While 
the defence may seem to adhere to mechanistic understandings of emotion, in concerning a 
temporary loss of rationality, it is also based on evaluative understandings that consider the 
reasonability of the emotional response of the defendant.
46
  
 
The legal framework, including that relating to sexual offences, is based not only on 
recognition of the role that emotion plays in cognitive processes but also on evaluations of 
the reasonability of such processes and resultant behaviour.  As Nussbaum and Kahan 
explain, the evaluative conception ‘holds that emotions express cognitive appraisals, that 
these appraisals can themselves be morally evaluated, and that persons (individually and 
collectively) can and should shape their emotions through moral education’.47  In prioritising 
rationality, ethical rationalism may fail to recognise the extent to which legal processes rely 
on evaluations of emotional responses and how such evaluations are themselves subject to 
shifting views of morality: ‘Because emotions involve appraisal, the appraisal of those 
emotions will reflect a society’s norms’.48 Evaluations of the reasonability of emotional 
responses in relation to sexual behaviour are, due to their very nature, a product of shifting 
views of morality. Thus, ethical rationalism may not be able to fully reflect the reality and 
complexity of sexual offences law and presents dangers regarding its relationship with legal 
moralism.  
 
 
                                                 
39
  N Naffine, Women and the Cast of Legal Persons’ in Jackie Jones, Anna Grear et al, Gender, 
Sexualities and Law (Routledge 2011) 15, 18. 
40
  We note that Beyleveld’s thought might not be considered either dualist or materialist. Our thanks to 
Shaun Pattinson for raising this important point. 
41
  A Grear, ‘Sexing the Matrix’: Embodiment, Disembodiment and the Law: Towards the Re-Gendering 
of Legal Personality?’, in J Jones, A Grear et al, Gender, Sexualities and Law (Routledge 2011), 42. 
42
  Hunter, n 43, at 14. 
43
  Nussbaum and Kahan, n 38. 
44
  Ibid. 
45
  Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s 54 
46
  Nussbaum, n 22, at 38–39.   
47
  Nussbaum and Kahan, n 38, at 274. 
48
  Nussbaum, n. 22, 46.   
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B. The Role of Emotion in Rape Law 
 
The mind/body, rational/emotional demarcation has historically played out in legal 
conceptualisations of the harm of rape and the ways in which the law assesses the state of 
mind of the defendant and the complainant.  Exploration of the conceptualisation of the harm 
of rape in the criminal law illustrates how emotional complexity and emotional harm have 
traditionally been elided and silenced.
49
 Historically, rape was conceptualised as a crime 
against property, and indeed the very term ‘rape’ stems from the Latin, ‘rapio’ meaning to 
steal or ‘carry off’. Rape was traditionally framed as a harm centred on male property 
ownership over the female body, as evident in the marital rape exception, which existed in 
English law until 1991.
50
 The feminine association with embodiment and the masculine 
association with the rational mind therefore traditionally lay at the heart of rape law.  
However, the conception of rape shifted dramatically in the last century, with a move in the 
common law away from the focus on physical force to an emphasis on individual consent, 
illustrating how moral understandings of the wrong rape have been subject to considerable 
change over time. The focus on consent in the conceptualisation of rape, as confirmed in the 
Sexual Offences Act 2003, constitutes an important legal development that foregrounds the 
notion of sexual autonomy.  While the concepts of autonomy and consent continue to reflect 
elements of a mechanistic approach to emotion, in terms of the mind/body, rational/emotion 
dualisms, they can also be used foreground emotional understandings.  Much therefore 
depends on how concepts of autonomy and consent are conceived.  
 
Autonomy lies at the heart of a rationalist model of legal personhood in terms of the 
sovereign, rational actor endowed with objectivity and self-possession.
51
  In this view, sexual 
autonomy is ‘the inherent right of the bounded legal person with sovereign control over their 
bodily property.  The wrong of rape then is the invasion and appropriation of that property 
without consent’.52 Such understandings of sexual autonomy tend to presume ‘a particular 
conception of the subject and an abstract, rational and self-serving framework for the 
operation of agency’.53 This demarcation between the body and the self focuses the harm of 
rape on the body and on the violation of sexual autonomy and bodily ownership, thus 
potentially obscuring the complex emotional harms involved.
54
  Such an understanding of 
autonomy may result in a failure to reflect the nature of the harm of rape and the experiences 
of complainants.  As Lacey highlighted in relation to rape law prior to the 2003 reforms, ‘At 
the level of doctrinal construction of criminal wrongdoing, affective experience is, if not 
absent, more or less invisible behind the veil of rational and abstract legal subjectivity’.55  
 
Nevertheless, the focus on consent and sexual autonomy can also enable recognition of the 
interrelationship between emotion and cognitive processes and can potentially foreground the 
importance of affective responses in the law. Consent and autonomy are concepts that can 
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include a more contextual approach and can recognise the ways in which emotions relate to 
and are influenced by social and interpersonal contexts. Emotions are not simply experienced 
individually but are socially situated.  Indeed, ‘affective responses—as potential signals of 
what we value—are continually being shaped and informed by the responses of others, and 
by social and cultural norms’.56 Sexual encounters and decisions to engage in sexual 
intercourse are not made in detached, abstracts settings, but are a product of desires, feelings, 
circumstances and social understandings of sexual behaviour.
57
 While autonomy can be 
conceived in terms of individual separation and boundedness, it can also be reconceived as a 
capacity that can be fostered through relationships with others.
58
  Similarly, ‘[c]onsent is a 
concept which we can fill with either narrow liberal values, based on the idea of the subject 
as an individual atomistic rational choice maker, or with feminist values encompassing 
attention to mutuality, embodiment, relational choice and communication’.59  
 
Beyleveld and Brownsword have provided us with a comprehensive account of how ethical 
rationalism and the PGC relates to consent in law.  Although their work is not specific to 
consent in sexual offences, it does include references to rape and does not perceive the need 
for a different understanding of consent in sexual offences law.  While we agree with many 
aspects of their account, we argue that fuller inclusion of emotionality is necessary in order to 
reflect the nature of consent in human interactions, particularly in the context of sexual 
offences.  The understanding of consent underlying their account continues to reflect a too 
narrow focus on individual autonomy—in our view—that prioritises rationality and does not 
sufficiently reflect the complex emotional elements of consent.   
 
Indeed, their predominant focus on rationality is evident in their inclusion of Gewirth’s 
requirement that ‘the recipient must be in an emotionally calm state of mind’.60  While we 
would agree that clear emotional distress or anxiety is obviously detrimental to the exercise 
of consent, we would wish to problematise the idea of emotionality employed here.  The fact 
that emotions are largely absent, at least explicitly, from their discussion of consent and thus 
only appear in terms of the need for emotional calm, results in a failure to explicitly recognise 
the inherent relationship between emotions and decision-making.  This suggests a general 
detachment from emotion, rather than recognition of the centrality of emotionality to human 
behaviour, cognition and experience. This is a problem because such factors count whenever 
considering the criminal law—and it is unclear how a more restricted view of rationally-
bounded emotions offers us a more attractive alternative.  
 
The focus in their account on the need for consent to be both unforced and informed is 
significant in potentially reflecting a broad conception of consent that examines surrounding 
context. However, despite the potential to include emotional aspects, this is not explicitly 
incorporated into the concept of consent that they develop. The understanding of agency and 
subjectivity at the heart of their account still seems to reflect a focus on human boundedness 
and an abstract view of human conduct.  Indeed, while they obviously recognise that consent 
operates in relation to others, their account does not encompass an understanding of consent 
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that recognises the socially-situated nature of the self and of emotionality. In line with this 
view of autonomy there remains an emphasis on the responsibility of the (consenting) agent 
in relation to whether or not the consent is informed, if they act recklessly or carelessly ‘in 
relation to their own informational field’.61  While there are obviously merits to this approach 
we would urge caution in applying this to sexual offences.  Given the prevalence of sexual 
stereotypes and rape myths, there is a danger that it may be overly burdensome on the 
complainant.   
 
Similarly, there is a need for caution in relation to their approach to the forced/unforced 
nature of consent.  Although it may be in many (or even most) circumstances that ‘positive 
pressure does not invalidate consent’, to hold that it never does so may be too stringent an 
approach.
62
 The emotional nature of sexual relationships means that even positive (in the 
sense of some incentive or inducement) external pressure can be problematic to consent to 
sex.  Such pressure may be exercised in emotional terms, through emotional blackmail and 
playing on the emotional vulnerability of the complainant. There are also clear gendered 
implications of not seeing positive external pressure as invalidating consent, given societal 
stereotypes of male sexual activity (in terms of initiating and pressuring for sex) and female 
passivity.  In terms of negative external pressure (which they argue does invalidate consent), 
their model allows for recognition of various degrees of pressure, seen through the 
Gewirthian hierarchy of generic needs.
63
  However, this hierarchy may fail to recognise the 
complexities of pressure exercised in relation to sexual offences and the ways in which 
gendered relations may influence the experience and impact of external pressure. Our point 
here is not that ethical rationalism is problematic because it has not been applied before to an 
understanding of sexual offences, but rather our uncertainty about whether it can provide a 
compelling alternative view of these crimes given the priority of rationality over emotions 
that it endorses.
64
 
 
The recent reforms to the law of rape in the Sexual Offences Act 2003 illustrate that while a 
broader approach to consent that includes elements of the wider context is significant, much 
depends on how the law is interpreted and applied in practice.  Indeed, feminist critiques of 
the law on sexual offences highlight that, despite reforms, the law is often interpreted and 
applied in ways that delimit recognition of gendered and emotional experiences. In remaining 
relatively abstract Beyleveld’s (and Brownsword’s) account does not reflect or address these 
complexities. The 2003 Act provides for the first time a statutory definition of consent, 
defined in terms of the concepts of ‘choice, freedom and capacity’, under s 74, which in some 
ways reflect elements of informed consent and an unforced choice.  The definition was aimed 
at providing a more communicative model that encourages attention to agreement between 
parties and a focus on the choice, freedom and capacity of the complainant to consent.
65
  
Rather than focusing on a simple binary of a yes/no decision of whether or not to engage in 
sexual intercourse, divorced from wider circumstances and emotions, the s 74 definition 
allows some of the context and emotional complexity surrounding consent to be considered.   
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The framework of consent in the Sexual Offences Act 2003 is also based on evidential and 
conclusive presumptions relating to consent and reasonable belief in consent.
66
  Included 
within the six circumstances that give rise to a rebuttable presumption of lack of consent (and 
lack of reasonable belief in consent by the defendant) under s 75 of the Sexual Offences Act, 
are fear of immediate violence and fear in situations where the complainant is unlawful 
detained. As such, understandings of consent have begun to be more explicitly related to 
emotional responses and behaviours, albeit that there remains a focus on simplistic emotions 
of fear, rather than more complex emotional states.   
 
However, the broad nature of the concepts of choice, freedom and capacity in the s 74 
definition means that while they could be interpreted broadly, they may also be interpreted 
narrowly, potentially suppressing the significance of the wider contexts surrounding sexual 
relations and how such contexts impact on the complainant’s and defendant’s emotional 
understandings and responses.
67
 Societal attitudes and morality feed into legal processes in 
terms of juror interpretations of consent and evaluations of complainant and defendant 
behaviour.  This again illustrates the importance of perceiving the social situatedness of 
emotion and the role of social attitudes, and indeed law itself, in shaping emotional responses 
and juror evaluations of such responses.
68
 Thus, while the shift in the mens rea of rape from 
an honest belief in consent to a reasonable belief can be seen to be positive, evaluation of the 
reasonability of such a belief is inevitably subject to societal attitudes regarding sexual 
behaviour.
69
  Although we support Beyleveld’s and Brownsword’s emphasis on an honest 
and reasonable belief, there is a need to recognise that reasonability can also be problematic 
in such contexts.  
 
In addition, societal attitudes feed into appraisals of the reasonability of the complainant’s 
emotional responses.  Rape complainants may suffer particularly during rape trials due to the 
failure of legal procedure to directly address the relationship between rationality and 
emotionality.  While the liberal notion of consent presumes a rational, autonomous individual 
with agency over their actions, the female complainant has historically been portrayed in 
society as an emotional woman who changes her mind: “no means yes”.  On the other hand, 
jurors may expect a degree of emotion from complainants, and may be more inclined to doubt 
testimony when complainants present an image of rationality and a calm demeanour. Indeed, 
Ellison and Munro’s research on mock jurors illustrates the degree to which a calm 
demeanour at trial, not reporting the offence immediately and lack of physical resistance 
during the rape by the complainant can negatively influence juror perceptions and render 
them less likely to believe the complainant.
70
  Their research indicated that mock jurors who 
had received education on possible emotional reactions of victims in the aftermath of rape 
‘were more willing to accept that a “genuine” victim could exhibit few signs of visible 
distress whilst testifying in court’.71 This illustrates the importance of foregrounding 
emotions in the legal treatment of rape, both substantively and procedurally.   
 
C. Legal moralism and the danger of certain emotions 
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While arguing for the legal importance of emotions, we also contend that law needs to be 
very careful which types of emotion exert influence and to be alert to the shifting nature of 
moral values. Again, it is important that an evaluative understanding of emotion is employed 
in order that there is recognition of the role that emotion necessarily plays in the law and of 
the need for emotions to be evaluated as to their reasonability.
72
  While sexual offences law 
has traditionally elided the role of emotions, it has also be subject to strong moralistic 
influences in which certain emotions, such as disgust, have played a significant role.
73
  In 
eliding the role of emotions and projecting an image of rationality, law thus hides the moral 
judgments inherent in it and the ways in which such moralism is itself unstable and subject to 
shifts over time.   It is important that emotions are not viewed as monolithic, as this may 
serve to may perpetuate perceptions of a simple dichotomy between reason and emotion.
74
 
Rather, emotions need to be differentiated and evaluated.  While some emotions have a 
positive role to play in law, other emotions are more problematic.
75
 
 
The nature of sexual offences law means that it has inevitably been subject to legal moralism 
in terms of the criminalisation of certain behaviours.  Indeed, the historic criminalisation of 
homosexuality is a poignant reminder of the influence of legal moralism in sexual offences 
law.  Debates between legal moralism and liberalism have been a feature of this area of law, 
most notably in the responses to the Wolfenden Report of 1957 and the Hart/Devlin debates.  
The tensions between legal moralism and liberalism continue to play out in current sexual 
offences law.  Indeed, despite the liberal claims evident within the Setting the Boundaries 
Review, which led to the Sexual Offences Act 2003, strong elements of legal moralism or 
‘quasi-moralism’ are also present.76  This can be seen, for example, in the criminalisation of 
sexual activity between minors (under the age of 16).  While these provisions contain some 
elements of concern to prevent harm to children, the blanket criminalisation of consensual 
activity between minors also illustrates the influence of moralistic concerns to prevent young 
adolescents from engaging in sexual experimentation with each other.
77
  Similarly, elements 
of moralism are evident in the criminalisation of bestiality, in s 69 of the Sexual Offences 
Act.  Indeed, the Setting the Boundaries Review justified criminalisation on the basis that 
bestiality reflected ‘profoundly disturbed behaviour’ and that ‘society had a profound 
abhorrence for this behaviour’.78  
 
In a cultural diverse society, such as the UK, moral consensus is unlikely, particularly in the 
area of sexual behaviour.
79
  The obvious danger of legal moralism is its impact on minority 
groups (and historically on women), whose behaviour may be subject to legal intervention on 
the basis of the offence taken by a ‘reasonable man’.  This is not to argue against the 
influence of moral considerations per se, nor is it to draw a clear demarcation between ‘harm’ 
and ‘offence’.  Indeed, as various commentators have argued, these concepts are far more 
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fluid than is often presented.
 80
  Instead, it is to argue that if moral considerations are to play 
are role then there needs to be careful appraisal of their basis. In particular, the emotional 
responses inherent in moral judgments need to be opened up and evaluated.
81
  The danger of 
legal moralism is that the emotional responses inherent in moral judgments are not 
acknowledged and thus are not subject to scrutiny as to their reasonableness.  In relation to 
the Sexual Offences Act the critique is therefore ‘not so much that it betrays its liberal 
pretensions by criminalising offensive conduct or by intervening into previously unregulated 
areas of life, but rather that it does so without any examination of the grounds on which 
underlying determinations of “right” and “wrong” have been made’.82 In applying ethical 
rationalism to the area of sexual offences there is the danger not only that it may obscure the 
tensions between liberalism and legal moralism inherent in the current law, but also that in 
obfuscating the emotion underlying moralistic responses it may prevent appraisal of the value 
of the particular emotion as a basis for legal intervention.  
 
Beyleveld has argued that  
 
Gewirth’s theory is ‘ahistorical’ in the sense that he does not derive the PGC from an 
assumption of any cultural norms. He derives the PGC dialectically from features that 
belong to [agents] necessarily, hence universally. These features are ‘transhistorical’ 
rather than ahistorical (here meaning not attending to the diversity of features of 
historically existing [agents]), belonging to [agents] regardless of the historical 
diversity that they manifest. They exist within historical diversity, not outside of it.
83
 
 
This passage suggests that the PGC provides us with an objective—or at least objectivist— 
standard by which to make judgements about permissibility concerning generic conditions for 
agency. It represents a one-size-fits-all that any permissible view about sexual offences 
should satisfy. To be fair, this does not require all legal communities to possess the same 
statutes or case law—diversity is permissible provided it is consistent with the PGC’s 
rationalism. This is an important point. But it is no less significant that our cultural norms 
inform much of our criminal law today—and not least sexual offences. Nor is it clear that 
these norms that are born from contingencies—and so may depart from the permissible 
boundaries set by an objective view of rationality—are mistaken as exposed through the 
application of the PGC. We do not doubt that the PGC can be used to construct a view of 
sexual offences, but we are unconvinced that it can provide a compelling alternative to the 
existing positions we have set out given how sexual offences have developed historically.  
 
4. Conclusion  
 
This chapter raises concerns about ethical rationalism’s relation to both legal theory and legal 
practices. We argue that rationalism is an important, but not the only or even primary factor 
in understanding ethical decision-making. We then considered the application of ethical 
rationalism to sexual offences and highlighted the need for careful consideration in applying 
the PGC to this area of law.  While recognising many of the merits of Beyleveld’s and 
Brownsword’s approach to consent, we argued for the importance of recognising an 
evaluative understanding of emotion that reflects the socially-situated nature of autonomy 
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and consent. In arguing for the importance of emotionality we also highlighted the dangers of 
legal moralism and the need to evaluate the merits of legal responses that are founded on 
emotions.  Our conclusion is that ethical rationalism represents an important voice in current 
debates, but it remains unclear for us that this view can provide a compelling alternative to 
how we understand certain areas of law like sexual offences—and we welcome more work to 
help develop this case by taking emotions more seriously.
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